AAA615: Formal Methods

Lecture 7 — SAT-based Program Analysis

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Bit-Level Static Analysis via Boolean Satisfiability

- Finding bugs in low-level systems code is challenging due to difficult-to-model language constructs such as pointers, bit-wise operators, and type casts, which requires bit-level reasoning.
- One successful approach is to encode program semantics at bit-level and translate it to a boolean satisfiability formula, exploiting impressive advances in solving boolean satisfiability.
- References:
 - A Tool for Checking ANSI-C Programs. TACAS 2004.
 - Scalable Error Detection using Boolean Satisfiability. POPL 2005.

Saturn¹

- A static error detection tool based on boolean satisfiability.
 - Yichen Xie and Alex Aiken. Scalable Error Detection using Boolean Satisfiability. POPL 2005.
- The analysis is path-sensitive, precise down to bit level, and models pointers and heap data. Yet highly scalable thanks to modern SAT solvers and various optimization techniques.
- In particular, Saturn performs a bottom-up analysis, which computes a summary of each analyzed function and reuses the summary when the function is called later.

A Low-Level Programming Language

A subset of the language that does not include structures and pointers:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \tau & \rightarrow & (n, \mathsf{signed} \mid \mathsf{unsigned}) \\ e & \rightarrow & \mathsf{unknown}(\tau) \mid \mathsf{const}(n, \tau) \mid x \mid -e \mid \ !e \mid e_1 \oplus e_2 \\ & \mid e_1 \text{ band } e_2 \mid e_1 \text{ lshift } e_2 \mid (\tau)e \mid \mathsf{lift}_e(c, \tau) \\ c & \rightarrow & \mathsf{true} \mid \mathsf{false} \mid \neg c \mid e_1 = e_2 \mid c_1 \land c_2 \mid c_1 \lor c_2 \mid \mathsf{lift}_c(e) \\ s & \rightarrow & \mathsf{skip} \mid x := e \mid \mathsf{assert}(c) \mid \mathsf{if} \ c \ s_1 \ s_2 \mid \mathsf{while} \ c \ s \mid s_1; s_2 \end{array}$$

Representation:

$$\begin{array}{lll} \beta & \rightarrow & [b_{n-1} \dots b_0]_s & \text{where } s \in \{ \text{signed}, \text{unsigned} \} \\ b & \rightarrow & 0 \mid 1 \mid \alpha \mid b_1 \wedge b_2 \mid b_1 \vee b_2 \mid \neg b \end{array}$$

Translation Rules (Expressions)

$$\begin{split} \frac{\beta = \psi(x)}{\psi \vdash x \stackrel{E}{\Rightarrow} \beta} & \frac{(n,s) = \tau}{\psi \vdash \mathsf{unknown}(\tau) \stackrel{E}{\Rightarrow} [\alpha_{n-1} \dots \alpha_0]_s} \alpha_i \text{ fresh} \\ \psi \vdash e \stackrel{E}{\Rightarrow} [b_{n-1} \dots b_0]_{s'} \quad b'_i = \begin{cases} b_i & \text{if } 0 \leq i < n \\ 0 & \text{if } s = \text{unsigned } \wedge n \leq i < m \\ b_{n-1} & \text{if } s = \text{signed } \wedge n \leq i < m \end{cases} \\ \psi \vdash (\tau) e \stackrel{E}{\Rightarrow} [b'_{m-1} \dots b'_0]_s \\ \frac{(n,s) = \tau \quad \psi \vdash c \stackrel{C}{\Rightarrow} b}{\psi \vdash \mathsf{lift}_e(c,\tau) \stackrel{E}{\Rightarrow} [0 \dots 0b]_s} \\ \frac{\psi \vdash e \stackrel{E}{\Rightarrow} [b_{n-1} \dots b_0]_s \quad \psi \vdash e' \stackrel{E}{\Rightarrow} [b'_{n-1} \dots b'_0]_s}{\psi \vdash e \text{ band } e' \stackrel{E}{\Rightarrow} [b_{n-1} \wedge b'_{n-1} \dots b_0 \wedge b'_0]_s} \end{split}$$

Translation Rules (Conditionals)

$$\begin{split} \psi \vdash \mathsf{true} \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} 1 \qquad \psi \vdash \mathsf{false} \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} 0 \\ \\ \frac{\psi \vdash c \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} b}{\psi \vdash \neg c \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} \neg b} \qquad \frac{\psi \vdash e \stackrel{\mathbb{E}}{\Rightarrow} [b_{n-1} \dots b_0]_s \quad \psi \vdash e' \stackrel{\mathbb{E}}{\Rightarrow} [b'_{n-1} \dots b'_0]_s}{\psi \vdash e_1 = e_2 \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} \bigwedge_i (b_i \wedge b'_i) \vee (\neg b_i \wedge \neg b'_i)} \\ \\ \frac{\psi \vdash c_1 \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} b_1 \quad \psi \vdash c_2 \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} b_2}{\psi \vdash c_1 \wedge c_2 \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} b_1 \wedge b_2} \qquad \frac{\psi \vdash c_1 \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} b_1 \quad \psi \vdash c_2 \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} b_2}{\psi \vdash c_1 \vee c_2 \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} b_1 \vee b_2} \\ \\ \\ \frac{\psi \vdash e \stackrel{\mathbb{E}}{\Rightarrow} [b_{n-1} \dots b_0]_s}{\psi \vdash \mathsf{lift}_c(e) \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} \bigvee_i b_i} \end{split}$$

Translation Rules (Statements)

$$\begin{split} \frac{\psi \vdash e \stackrel{\mathbb{E}}{\Rightarrow} \beta}{\mathcal{G}, \psi \vdash x := e \stackrel{\mathbb{S}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{G}, \psi[x \mapsto \beta]} \\ \frac{\psi \vdash c \stackrel{\mathbb{C}}{\Rightarrow} b \quad (\mathcal{G} \land \neg b) \text{ unsatisfiable}}{\mathcal{G}, \psi \vdash \text{ assert}(c) \stackrel{\mathbb{S}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{G}, \psi} \\ \frac{\mathcal{G} \land c, \psi \vdash s_1 \stackrel{\mathbb{S}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{G}_1, \psi_1 \quad \mathcal{G} \land \neg c, \psi \vdash s_2 \stackrel{\mathbb{S}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{G}_2, \psi_2}{\mathcal{G}, \psi \vdash \text{ if } c \ s_1 \ s_2 \stackrel{\mathbb{S}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{G}_1 \lor \mathcal{G}_2, \lambda x. [(\mathcal{G}_1 \land b_m) \lor (\mathcal{G}_2 \land b'_m) \dots]} \\ \text{ where } \psi_1(x) = [b_m \dots b_0]_s, \psi_2(x) = [b'_m \dots b'_0]_s \\ \frac{\mathcal{G}, \psi \vdash \text{ if } c \ s \ \text{skip; if } c \ s \ \text{skip} \stackrel{\mathbb{S}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{G}', \psi'}{\mathcal{G}, \psi \vdash \text{ while } c \ s \stackrel{\mathbb{S}}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{G}', \psi'} \end{split}$$


Structures and Pointers

- The extension with structures is rather straightforward.
- Translation of pointers is more involved and maintains path sensitivity for heap locations by introducing *guarded locations*.
 - A pointer points to a set of guarded locations.
 - A guarded location is a location associated with a boolean guard that represents the condition under which the points-to relationship holds.

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{if } (c) \ p = \&x & // \ p : \{(\texttt{true}, x)\} \\ \text{else } p = \&y & // \ p : \{(\texttt{true}, y)\} \\ *p = 3; & // \ p : \{(c, x), (\neg c, y)\} \end{array}$$

Interprocedural Analysis

- A common technique is inlining. However, inlining incurs exponential blow-up, not practical for large software systems.
- Saturn uses a bottom-up, summary-based interprocedural analysis.



Experimental Results

- Saturn can be instantiated into various error detection tools by defining appropriate function summaries.
- E.g., memory leak detection, lock checking (e.g. double lock/unlock)
- In Linux kernel (4.8 MLoC), Saturn found 179 lock-related errors with a false positive rate of 40%.